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Following a familiar pattern of UN climate change 
negotiations, the 2011 Durban conference of the parties 
(COP17) was concluded by sleep-deprived delegates well 
after its scheduled end, after crises and last-minute drama. 
Just what it might mean for the future was not immediately 
obvious to observers. Early reactions ranged from seeing 
yet another failure by governments to grasp the seriousness 
and urgency of climate change – ‘a disaster for us all’1 – to 
much more positive assessments. The executive secretary of 
the UNFCCC (the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change), Christiana Figueres, described Durban 
as ‘without doubt … the most encompassing and furthest 
reaching conference in the history of the climate change 
negotiations’.2 
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To make sense of the outcome, it 
helps to view the short history of these 
negotiations through a political lens. 
Each conference of the parties, besides 
whatever operational decisions it takes 
and work programmes it initiates, is a 
snapshot of the international community’s 
political take on climate change. In this 
sense, Durban can be seen as the product 
of Montreal (2005), Bali (2007) and 
Copenhagen (2009) conferences of the 
parties, with clear political steps forward 
every two years. That is not to say the 
intervening COPs, Nairobi (2006), 
Poznan´ (2008) and Cancún (2010), made 
no contribution. They all helped advance 
the negotiations; Cancún indeed probably 
saved the multilateral process. But the 
intervening year COPs lacked the political 
impact of the others, and produced no 
new framing of the negotiations. 
The Framework Convention and the Kyoto 
Protocol
Going back still further, the political 
history begins with the negotiation 
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of the framework convention in 1992, 
the first multilateral treaty on climate 
change. Informed by the first assessment 
report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC), the UNFCCC 
sets out the core objective of stabilising 
greenhouse gas concentrations at a level 
that would avoid dangerous human-
induced climate change. The principles 
by which this objective is to be achieved 
include what must be the most frequently 
quoted words in the UNFCCC: ‘common 
but differentiated responsibilities and 
respective capabilities’ (CBDR). CBDR 
can be seen as a very broad guiding 
principle for burden-sharing. Taken 
together with the principle of equity, it 
justifies the recognition in the convention 
that developed countries should take the 
lead in combating climate change. The 
convention also introduced a fundamental 
and fateful separation of parties into two 
classes: annex I and non-annex I, with 
annex I consisting of developed countries 
(approximately reflecting OECD 
membership in 1990) plus economies in 
transition. 
The convention contains a legally 
binding requirement on all parties to 
take measures to mitigate climate change, 
but no mechanism that will ensure this 
happens. Its only quantified goal is a 
non-binding target for annex I parties as 
a whole to return their emissions to 1990 
levels by the year 2000. 
The convention can be regarded 
as the first phase of the quest for a 
comprehensive multilateral climate 
change framework containing both 
principles and effective action. The 
second phase was the Kyoto Protocol, 
concluded in 1997 but only entering into 
force in 2005. The protocol provided for 
the first time clear accounting rules, a firm 
aggregate reduction target for greenhouse 
gas emissions, legally binding country-
by-country quantified commitments, 
and compliance provisions. It introduced 
international carbon market mechanisms 
to help achieve mitigation at least 
cost, notably the innovative Clean 
Development Mechanism. The quantified 
economy-wide mitigation commitments 
(‘qelros’) listed in an annex to the 
protocol resolved burden-sharing among 
annex I parties for the first commitment 
period, 2008–2012. But the protocol did 
not address mitigation amongst non-
annex I parties.
The protocol retained the political 
balance of the convention. Indeed, that 
the political balance between annex I and 
non-annex I obligations was unchanged 
was explicit in the Berlin Mandate’s 
stipulation that there would be no new 
commitments for non-annex I parties.3 
The protocol can be seen as a tighter and 
more detailed specification of annex I 
obligations, implementing the principle 
of ‘taking the lead’. 
Towards a comprehensive climate change 
regime
The third phase of negotiations began 
in 2005. The core objective of the 
convention, together with the principles 
on which it and the protocol were built, 
remained valid but could not chart a 
way forward. The stabilisation goal was 
not quantified, either as a temperature 
limit or a greenhouse gas concentration. 
Further, the absence of the United States, 
the largest emitter, and Australia from 
the Kyoto Protocol made even annex I 
commitments incomplete. Even more 
important for the future, projections of 
global emissions showed that by the end 
of the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment 
period, China would have overtaken 
the United States as the largest emitter. 
Developing countries in aggregate would 
also have overtaken annex I parties, and 
would be the dominant source of most 
of the emissions growth to 2050 and 
beyond. 
At Montreal in 2005, the built-in 
deadline in the Kyoto Protocol to begin 
negotiations on further commitments 
for annex I parties was the catalyst for 
developed countries to try to bring 
developing country emissions into the 
framework. This meant putting the 
negotiations on a broader footing. The 
absence of the United States from Kyoto 
meant that the developed countries’ 
objectives could not be met simply by 
complementary provisions under the 
convention for developing countries. But 
any shift towards quantified mitigation 
commitments from developing countries 
was resisted as contrary to the burden-
sharing principles of the convention. In 
practice, CBDR and the annex I/non-
annex I dichotomy were combined in 
political rhetoric to prevent a smooth 
evolution of the climate change regime 
to reflect the changing global economy. 
There was too much vested interest in the 
status quo to allow the interpretation of 
these principles to evolve. 
This led to a ‘two-track’ situation. 
For two years after Montreal the tracks 
had unequal status. The first track was a 
formal negotiation under article 3.9 of the 
Kyoto Protocol; the second a ‘dialogue’ 
under the convention which introduced 
the term ‘long-term cooperative action’ 
(LCA). Somewhat reminiscent of the 
Berlin Mandate, the decision creating 
the dialogue stated that it would not 
open any negotiations leading to new 
commitments. The dialogue’s value was 
to introduce some of the themes that 
would later be taken up in negotiations, 
once the politics allowed it. 
Politically, there was thus an imbalance 
from the point of view of annex I 
parties. It was unrealistic to expect them 
to implement further commitments 
without the United States and emerging 
At Montreal in 2005, the built-in deadline in the 
Kyoto Protocol to begin negotiations on further 
commitments for annex I parties was the catalyst 
for developed countries to try to bring developing 
country emissions into the framework.
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economies. But developing countries 
also complained of an imbalance. They 
saw annex I parties upping demands 
on developing countries while neither 
demonstrating sufficient ambition over 
their own commitments nor recognising 
the importance of adaptation, finance 
and technology to developing countries. 
Bali, in 2007, was the turning point 
into a full negotiation, albeit still with 
two tracks, with a new political balance 
which took account of these concerns. 
The convention mandate, which retained 
the ‘LCA’ title, could be read as applying 
to all parties, even though developing 
countries at this point insisted that annex 
I Kyoto Protocol parties must make their 
commitments under Kyoto. Some new 
language was necessary to effect this 
political shift. The distinction between 
commitments and actions was introduced 
to get around the difficulty for the United 
States of the legally binding implication 
of ‘commitment’, and at the same time to 
make a distinction between the nature of 
what developing and developed countries 
would commit to. The terms ‘measurable, 
reportable, verifiable’ and ‘nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions’ (NAMAs) 
applied to developing country mitigation 
implied some quantification, but not so 
far as to make the actions legally binding 
or qelros. At Bali the central importance 
to progress in the negotiations of the 
relationship between the United States 
and China and other major developing 
country emitters became apparent. Legal 
parallelism was and remained a central 
theme of the United States, including at 
Durban. This meant that while the content 
of commitments could be differentiated, 
thus respecting the CBDR principle, their 
legal force had to be equivalent. 
The annex I/non-annex I dichotomy 
was blurred in the Bali mandate (the Bali 
Action Plan), which refers to ‘developed’ 
and ‘developing’ countries, though of 
course the Kyoto track of solely annex I 
commitments continued independently. 
Though it was not initially made explicit, 
there was a strong wish among most 
annex I parties for a legally binding 
outcome under the convention track, as 
much to bring the US under equivalent 
obligations to other developed countries 
as to include the emerging economies. 
The emerging economies were not able 
to agree to a legally binding outcome; 
the requisite constructive ambiguity was 
achieved by the term ‘agreed outcome’, 
the meaning of which was argued over 
for the next four years. The concept 
of comparability was also introduced, 
primarily aimed at the United States, to 
indicate that the United States would be 
expected to take on commitments under 
the convention of comparable ambition 
to those of other annex I parties under 
the protocol. 
Highly inefficient and cumbersome 
from a negotiating perspective, the 
separation of the two tracks became a 
theme of the post-Bali negotiations, as 
much for the United States, for whom the 
Kyoto Protocol was toxic, as for developing 
economies anxious to avoid being 
pressured into Kyoto-type commitments. 
For most developed countries this mode 
of negotiation was a second-best option, 
one better than the third-best that 
Montreal had delivered but inferior to a 
single negotiation. A supposed ‘firewall’ 
between the two tracks was invented, 
much invoked by developing countries, 
and tacitly supported by the United 
States. Efforts by chairs and moderate 
countries to engage in ‘across the tracks’ 
discussions to achieve some coherence on 
common issues such as accounting rules 
were always controversial and never got 
off the ground in the formal settings. 
Bali’s contribution was also to identify 
the elements needed in any comprehensive 
regime. They included mitigation, of 
course, but also adaptation, finance, 
technology, and reducing emissions 
from deforestation (REDD+), together 
with openings towards possible sectoral 
approaches and new market mechanisms. 
As the scheduled conclusion of 
the Bali Action Plan approached, 
negotiations were heading for a train 
wreck. None of the fundamental issues 
had been resolved; at one point there 
were about 300 pages of negotiating text, 
with 3,000 square brackets indicating 
areas of disagreement. Added to this 
was a lack of trust, made more acute 
by shortcomings in the management 
of the pre-Copenhagen process by the 
incoming Danish presidency. A symptom 
of the trust deficit was the Danes’ having 
to change the signage part way through 
the conference from ‘COP 15’ to ‘COP 15 
CMP 5’,4 in response to complaints from 
some developing countries that the Kyoto 
Protocol was being airbrushed out of the 
negotiations. Previous conferences had 
used ‘COP X’ without incident. 
The last-minute rescue of the 
conference by a handful of world leaders 
through a side deal – the Copenhagen 
Accord – was, in retrospect, a decisive 
political intervention. Despite not being 
agreed by the COP, it introduced a new 
framing of the negotiations. Its main 
political advances were to agree on the 
global goal of limiting warming to 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels, to extract 
mitigation pledges from all parties 
that mattered, some at the conference 
itself and others in the months that 
followed, and to address accountability 
of developing countries’ mitigation 
actions. Developing countries’ actions 
would be subject to a form of peer review 
through ‘international consultations and 
analysis’, a concept that was to be further 
developed in Cancún and Durban. Close 
in importance were the provisions on 
finance, which included an immediate 
and unconditional injection over three 
The last-minute rescue of the conference by a 
handful of world leaders through a side deal –  
the Copenhagen Accord – was, in retrospect,  
a decisive political intervention. 
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years of $US10 billion per year, an 
aspirational target of mobilising $US100 
billion dollars from a range of sources by 
2020, and the establishment of a Green 
Climate Fund. The core political bargain 
was the two-way conditionality between 
developing country mitigation and long-
term finance. 
The decisions of Cancún, concluded 
over Bolivian objections in successive 
moments of high drama, brought both 
the political gains of the Copenhagen 
Accord and the mitigation pledges it had 
attracted into the UNFCCC, and thereby 
into the formal negotiations. Cancún also 
set up a work programme, institutions, 
architecture and rules to operationalise 
the political gains. 
2011: The Durban year
Unlike Mexico and Denmark, who put 
their stamp on the preparations from early 
in their year, South Africa as incoming 
presidency gave few early signals of its 
approach. One point repeatedly made, 
however, was that the process would be 
open and inclusive and there would be no 
secret text. South Africa apparently did 
not want to risk a third contested ending 
to a COP in as many years. 
Another political reframing occurred 
during this year. The core political issues 
that would have to be resolved at the 
COP were explored in informal meetings 
of ministers and senior negotiators. 
Parties themselves were noticeably clearer 
and more direct about their demands 
than in previous years. Three issues 
dominated the political discussions: the 
second commitment period of the Kyoto 
Protocol; finance (principally the Green 
Climate Fund); and the mandate for a 
negotiation of a new, comprehensive 
agreement. Because of intertwining 
conditionalities, none of the three could 
be achieved without the other two. For 
the United States, not a demander of a 
new negotiating mandate, what mattered 
most was strict legal parity of mitigation 
commitments with China. 2011 also saw a 
stronger political role being played by the 
BASIC5 countries – the major emitters 
among developing countries. Arguing on 
the basis of equitable access to sustainable 
development, they maintained that 
they still needed room to increase their 
emissions; their mitigation pledges to 
2020 would thus slow emissions growth, 
but would not be a net reduction.
What of mitigation ambition, which is 
surely the core of the whole negotiation? 
The major players – the United States, the 
EU and BASIC countries – had signalled 
that they would maintain their existing 
pledges, but would not improve them. 
The economic recession severely limited 
flexibility, and it would not have been 
a propitious time to put pressure on 
governments to offer more. Nor were 
annex I parties going to be able to finalise 
the conversion of their pledges to qelros 
at Durban. So there could be no realistic 
expectations that Durban would deliver 
higher ambition. The common lowering 
of expectations on ambition among the 
major players had a liberating effect on 
the negotiations. It must be said that this 
exercise in realpolitik deeply disappointed 
small island states, least-developed and 
African countries, who continued to hold 
out for greater ambition, and for a global 
temperature goal of 1.5°C. 
The recognition of the importance 
of the second commitment period by 
developed countries, even the United 
States, which had earlier virtually ignored 
the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, was a 
useful signal. ‘Preserving Kyoto’ became 
an iconic theme and a touchstone of the 
whole climate change negotiation in the 
media. But the intense political focus on 
the second commitment period as an end 
in itself made it easier to reach a deal, 
since content was less in the spotlight. 
Several parties – Canada, Japan and the 
Russian Federation – had stated that 
they would not be making mitigation 
commitments under Kyoto. Australia 
and New Zealand were equivocal. 
Whether or not there would be a second 
commitment period became dependent 
on the European Union. The percentage 
of global emissions covered by likely Kyoto 
committers – around 15% and declining 
– meant that the Kyoto Protocol could 
not realistically be the vehicle for annex 
I mitigation commitments beyond 2020. 
That gave the EU leverage for achieving 
its balancing requirement of a negotiation 
towards a legally binding agreement that 
would encompass all major emitters.
Once this had been accepted, the 
previous status of the Kyoto Protocol 
as the instrument by which all annex I 
parties except the United States made 
their commitments was lost. So was any 
thought that a two-treaty outcome to the 
negotiations could work. A more stable 
and long-term solution was needed. So 
2013–2020 came to be seen, and more and 
more referred to, as a transition period. 
To allow this to go unchallenged was 
a substantial concession by developing 
countries, and opened the way to a new 
negotiating mandate. 
For those annex I parties not making 
commitments under Kyoto, and for all 
developing countries, the LCA had the 
task of constructing a parallel framework 
to ensure that there was full coverage 
of mitigation up to 2020. The challenge 
was to find equivalent disciplines to 
those embodied in Kyoto’s reporting and 
accounting rules. The elements, from 
Bali and Cancún, were all there, but this 
negotiation was far less mature than the 
Kyoto Protocol track. It had started two 
years later, and there was a large volume 
of unagreed and still not fully digested 
text. 
The impact of the LCA and other related COP 
decisions is to provide a structure for mitigation 
commitments and associated needs such as 
finance, technology and adaptation, applicable to 
all parties up to 2020.
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In keeping with its approach earlier 
in the year, South Africa chose not to 
step in at Durban and take over from 
the chairs of the two ad hoc negotiating 
groups to craft a deal. There were 
some informal consultations under the 
presidency – ‘indabas’– in parallel, but 
these were always to feed back into the 
negotiations under the chairs. Very late in 
the conference South Africa invited some 
ministers, including Tim Groser from 
New Zealand, to facilitate agreement on 
the sticking points under the LCA. South 
Africa presided over discussions on the 
new negotiating mandate, which did not 
have a home in either negotiating group. 
A late and successful intervention by the 
COP president called for adoption of the 
Kyoto Protocol and LCA decisions and the 
new mandate as a package. The result was 
that, although it might have taken longer 
than necessary, and came close to failure, 
there can be no doubt that there was a 
full consensus on the outcome and that 
Durban was a party-driven result. That is 
a firmer base on which to negotiate than 
either Copenhagen or Cancún.
The Durban deal
Results under the Kyoto Protocol, the 
convention and the new mandate are 
a surprisingly coherent package.6 The 
Kyoto Protocol establishes the second 
commitment period, thus avoiding a legal 
vacuum after 2012. A more important 
achievement under Kyoto for the longer 
term was the settling of most accounting 
rules for the second commitment period. 
The post-2012 rules on land use change 
and forestry (LULUCF), which were 
unfinished business from 10 years earlier, 
were finalised with a package centred 
on the new concept of reference levels, 
and other rule changes. The market 
mechanisms were also maintained intact, 
whereas they had been under threat 
during the negotiations. 
The impact of the LCA and other 
related COP decisions is to provide a 
structure for mitigation commitments 
and associated needs such as finance, 
technology and adaptation, applicable 
to all parties up to 2020. In combination 
with the Kyoto Protocol, 80% of 
global emissions are now covered. The 
distinction between qelros and actions 
is retained, thereby maintaining some 
of the long-standing dichotomy among 
parties. It sets out a viable alternative to 
the Kyoto Protocol’s model, having to 
meet similar concerns of comparability, 
transparency and review. The Durban 
outcomes under the convention can be 
seen as building blocks which will be part 
of the new regime to be negotiated by 
2015, and to apply from 2020. The Kyoto 
Protocol and convention outcomes are 
complementary, and make the transition 
period complete. 
The biggest political advance of 
Durban is, of course, the mandate for a 
new negotiation, the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action (DPA), towards ‘a 
protocol, another legal instrument or an 
agreed outcome with legal force’ under 
the convention, ‘applicable to all’. There is 
still some constructive ambiguity in the 
term ‘outcome with legal force’, found in 
the final ‘huddle’ in the plenary. But the 
context of these words gives, compared 
to Bali’s ‘agreed outcome’, a stronger 
implication of something closer to a legal 
instrument than to a set of non-binding 
decisions. The words ‘applicable to all’ 
also strengthen the political framing in the 
same direction. The mandate leaves open 
how the Kyoto Protocol and LCA results 
will be incorporated in a new agreement; 
there is no explicit requirement to retain 
the annex I/non-annex I dichotomy. Nor 
is CBDR restated. 
And ambition? There was no progress 
at Durban that could be measured in 
tonnes of CO
2
. But ambition was not 
ignored. It is hard to imagine stronger 
political language than the ‘grave concern’ 
expressed at the gap between aggregate 
efforts and any emissions trajectories that 
could achieve the 2°C target. The DPA 
mandate is unequivocal that it ‘shall’ raise 
ambition. A work plan on increasing 
ambition will be established. The approach 
to increasing ambition is consistent across 
the Kyoto Protocol, the LCA and the 
DPA. A review is to take place in 2013–
2015, which will include consideration 
of the IPCC’s fifth assessment report. 
What the IPCC has to say about global 
goals (whether expressed as temperature, 
peaking year or emissions reduction) 
and the means of attaining them will 
come under intense scrutiny, even more 
so than the fourth assessment report. It 
is very likely that aggregate efforts will 
still be inadequate in 2015, in which case 
there will be pressure on parties to do 
more. That was why many developing 
countries would not accept an eight-year 
second commitment period at Durban, 
even though, to be coherent with LCA, 
it is the only logical one. The outcome 
under the LCA will apply to 2020, so if 
the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment 
period were to end in 2017 a potential 
three-year gap under the protocol would 
create uncertainty. The need to decide on 
five or eight years may give developing 
countries some negotiating leverage to 
trade off eight years for something more 
on ambition. 
The model of accountability for 
emissions reductions that is being 
explored under the pledge and review 
approach emerging from the LCA is one 
of peer pressure and transparency. This 
would operate more like some OECD 
or World Trade Organization review 
mechanisms, and less like the legally 
binding with compliance provisions 
model of Kyoto. This does not necessarily 
make it less effective. It has been 
recognised that the will of states to do 
The model of accountability for emissions 
reductions that is being explored under the pledge 
and review approach emerging from the LCA is one 
of peer pressure and transparency.
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what they say is not synonymous with the 
degree of ‘bindingness’ of any obligation.7 
Within a legally binding framework, such 
as the convention itself, there may be 
effective non-legally binding disciplines. 
This is often described as a ‘bottom-up’ 
approach, in contrast to Kyoto’s supposed 
‘top-down’ model. But just as Kyoto is 
not entirely top-down, this convention 
model is not purely bottom-up. A top-
down approach is still necessary to assess 
collective progress against global goals, 
and indeed to address the global goals 
themselves. The integrity of the system 
will still need to be ensured by rigorous 
rules and enforcement of reporting of 
emissions.
It is worth noting the contribution 
New Zealand made to the Durban 
outcome. Being represented as Kyoto 
Protocol chair, and having Tim Groser 
facilitating core political elements of the 
LCA gave New Zealand the major role in 
achieving the mitigation package across 
the two existing tracks of the negotiation. 
In addition, New Zealand officials 
were influential in several areas of the 
discussions.
New Zealand’s interests emerged intact. 
New Zealand retained its flexibility on not 
only where its mitigation commitment 
will be made, but also the final figure. 
There were notable gains for New Zealand 
in the new Kyoto Protocol forestry rules, 
which achieved provisions New Zealand 
had been seeking on land use flexibility 
and harvested wood products, as well as 
reference levels, a way of smoothing out 
the effects of longer-term planting and 
harvesting trends. Advances on market 
mechanisms and on agriculture were also 
welcome. The certainty over the Kyoto 
accounting rules should be helpful to the 
emissions trading scheme. 
Prospects 
The initial challenge for the negotiations is 
logistic more than political. Three ad hoc 
negotiating bodies will meet during 2012: 
the Kyoto Protocol and the LCA groups 
in their final year, and the new DPA. The 
LCA still has much work to conclude. 
Several other new bodies, including for 
adaptation, finance, technology and 
response measures, have to be fitted 
into the tight schedule. Already most 
negotiating meetings have been limited to 
90 minutes, which means not much more 
than an hour of actual negotiating time. 
The absurdly high number of meetings, 
many overlapping, makes huge demands 
on small delegations and on the secretariat 
which must service them. There is also 
more work required in capitals to prepare 
the submissions invited on nearly 40 
separate subjects for 2012. This could all 
spell a procedural quagmire. 
Negotiators may struggle with their 
workload in 2012, and the DPA may make 
a slow start, but this takes nothing away 
from the political gains made at Durban. 
Following the two-yearly cycle of political 
progress, Durban should be good for at 
least another two years, perhaps even 
longer this time. The UNFCCC has four 
years to conclude an agreement, twice 
the time it took to negotiate the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
The elements of the new regime are 
likely be those listed in the DPA and in 
the Bali Action Plan before it. The neatest 
solution to legal form would be for 
another protocol under the convention, 
with common rules which might 
incorporate much of the Kyoto Protocol 
acquis. One would also expect much of 
the LCA outcome to be reflected in the 
new instrument. The core mitigation 
component of the future regime will 
thus logically be a merging of Kyoto 
and the convention, with commonality 
of treatment among major emitters, 
whether developed or developing. 
Mitigation commitments are likely to be 
more varied, with other measures such 
as intensity targets co-existing alongside 
economy-wide emissions caps. The 
distinction between major emitters and 
groups such as the small island states and 
least-developed countries may replace the 
annex I/non-annex I dichotomy. If this 
does happen, CBDR can still be respected 
by invoking ‘national circumstances’. 
There are many uncertainties as the 
transition period approaches. Carbon 
prices remain depressed as a result of 
economic recession and uncertainty about 
the future of climate change negotiations. 
Durban did not lift the market. Will 
the major economies continue to direct 
their own countries down the path of 
low emissions growth so that there are 
incentives to keep up investment in the 
green economy? Will the United States 
be able to deliver on its 2020 mitigation 
pledge? Will the politics allow a step 
change in ambition in 2015? Will the 
international community come up with 
a way of dealing with the unfinished 
business of air and maritime emissions, on 
which the UN has made no real progress? 
How will the BASIC countries use their 
increasing weight, in terms of both their 
economies and their emissions? Will the 
UNFCCC adopt more efficient modes of 
negotiation in 2013?
The political groundwork has been 
done to allow the completion of the third 
phase of the international response to 
climate change. If the political will holds, 
and some creative thinking is applied, 
this could settle the legal framework to 
mid-century, without needing constant 
renegotiation. But it will be two or three 
years before it will be possible to judge 
whether or not the UNFCCC executive 
secretary was right in what she said in 
January 2012. 
1 Claudia Roth, co-chair of the German Greens, quoted in 
Deutsche Welle, 12 December 2011, www.dw.de/dw.
2 Speech to World Future Energy Summit, Abu Dhabi, 12 
January 2012, unfccc.int/files/press/statements/application/
pdf/120119_speech_wfes.pdf.
3 Decision 1/CP.1 in document FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, 6 
June 1995.
4 CMP is the acronym for the Conference of the Parties of the 
Convention serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
5 Brazil, South Africa, India and China. BASIC meets quarterly 
at ministerial level, and has continued to be active since 
Durban, for example in opposing the European Union’s 
carbon tax on airlines. 
6 For a summary and analysis of the Durban results, see http://
www.iisd.ca/climate/cop17. The Durban texts are on the 
UNFCCC website: unfccc.int/meetings/durban_nov_2011/
meeting/6245.php.
7 See, for example, Daniel Bodansky and Elliott Diringer, The 
Evolution of Multilateral Regimes, Washington, DC: Pew 
Center, 2010.
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